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Policymakers and academics are increasingly interested in applying financial incentives to individuals
in education.  This paper presents evidence from a pay for performance program taking place in Coshocton,
Ohio.  Since 2004, Coshocton has provided cash payments to students in grades three through six for
successful completion of their standardized testing.  Coshocton determined eligibility for the program
using randomization, and using this randomization, this paper identifies the effects of the program
on students' academic behavior. We find that math scores improved about 0.15 standard deviations
but that reading, social science, and science test scores did not improve.
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In recent years, economists, policymakers, and education researchers have become 
increasingly interested in the role that incentives play in education.  In the United States, for 
example, No Child Left Behind and other recent educational reforms have changed the incentives 
surrounding state-mandated test scores by creating penalties if students' academic performance is 
not improving or if it does not meet a certain level.  Outside the United States, parents and 
children can receive cash rewards for school attendance and regular check-ups (e.g. Progresa in 
Mexico), for student test scores (e.g. recent experiments in Kenya and Israel), or for college 
attendance (e.g. England's EMA program).   
In Fall 2004, Coshocton City Schools (Coshocton, Ohio) developed a financial incentive 
program focused on improving students' academic performance in primary school.  With the 
financial support of a local foundation, Coshocton began making cash payments to students for 
successful completion of their standardized testing.  Students in third, fourth, fifth, and sixth 
grade who passed district and state-mandated standardized exams became eligible for these 
rewards.   
The rationale for these cash payments is straightforward.  While academic achievement 
in early grades can greatly improve students' long-run success – facilitating college attendance 
and greater job opportunities (e.g. Schweinhart and Weikart 2002), these long-run benefits are 
intangible to many young children.  Few third, fourth, fifth, or sixth graders actively think about 
college attendance or employment.  Additionally, children are inherently impatient, and many 
studies in education, psychology, and economics document how children are often more 
motivated by short-run rewards than less tangible long-run rewards (e.g. Chelonis, Flake, 
Baldwin, Blake and Paule 2004, Harbaugh and Krause 1998, Bettinger and Slonim 2007).   
The Coshocton experiment makes a unique contribution to previous research in 
economics, education, and psychology.  Recent studies in economics (e.g. Angrist and Lavy 
2009, Angrist, Lang, and Oreopoulos 2007, Kremer, Miguel and Thornton 2008, Leuven, 
Oosterbeek, and van der Klaauw 2010, Fryer 2010) have largely focused on the effects of 
external incentives on students' academic achievement among students in secondary and post-
secondary schools.   Coshocton is the first study in economics to focus on financial incentives for 
student achievement in primary schools.  The Coshocton experiment also builds on prior 
literature in psychology.  Psychologists have been particularly active in the development of   2
theory and evidence on the role of financial incentive programs.  Most of the early literature on 
“token economies” and incentives focused on the effects of external or extrinsic motivators on 
individual’s intrinsic motivation (e.g. Ayllon & Azrin 1968, Kazdin 1975a & 1975b, Kazdin & 
Bootzin 1972, Deci 1975, Lepper, Greene, & Nisbett 1973).  In Coshocton, we were able to 
gather data on intrinsic motivation among students and can measure the impact of the program 
on intrinsic motivation.  In our discussion of the results, we attempt to reconcile the recent 
findings in economics with previous literature from psychology. 
One of the most important features of the Coshocton incentive program is the fact that the 
district assigned eligibility for the program using randomization.  This was a condition mandated 
by the sponsoring foundation.  The unit of randomization is a grade-school level (i.e. grade i at 
school j), and Coshocton city schools conducted lotteries at the beginning of the 2004-05, 2005-
06, and 2006-07 school years.  In each year, half of all students in grades three through six 
became eligible for the financial incentive which can be as much as $100 per student.   
Coshocton may be an ideal place to study financial incentives for several reasons.  First, 
Coshocton is a disadvantaged, poor community at the foot of Appalachia.  It may be a perfect 
place to measure the extent and potential of financial incentives to improve academic 
achievement among disadvantaged students.  Second, Coshocton was nearly in a state of 
academic emergency in 1999.  District leaders were willing to try non-traditional ways of 
improving student achievement, and this willingness set the stage for the program’s adoption.  
Finally, Coshocton’s small yet intimate community afforded us unique access to students, 
teachers, and parents.  As a result, not only can this research show quantitative evidence on the 
overall effect of the incentive program, but it may also yield insights into specific mechanisms 
by which the incentive program affected students. 
The primary focus of this paper is on measuring the effects of Coshocton's program on 
student achievement.  We find that math scores improved about 0.15 standard deviations higher 
for students who were eligible for the program relative to the control group.  This effect occurs 
throughout the distribution of math test scores.  In contrast to math, the estimated effects on 
reading, social science, and science test scores are both small and imprecise.  We find that 
students' intrinsic motivation is not significantly lower as a result of participating in the program.  
In the final section of the paper, we present some evidence on the cost-effectiveness of 
Coshocton's program.  In short, the Coshocton incentive program was a highly cost-effective   3





Previous Research on Financial Incentives and Student Achievement 
School administrators and parents have long believed that students are motivated by 
short-run stimuli.  As early as 1820, New York City introduced a system of financial rewards for 
students who performed well at school (Ravitch 1974).  There are also many anecdotes of 
teachers or principals offering pizza parties, visits to museums, and other forms of entertainment 
to students who pass standardized exams.  Additionally, many parents offer their children cash or 
other rewards for good grades,
1 and in the last decade, policymakers throughout the world have 
experimented with programs that pay students for academic performance.  For example, New 
York City, Washington, D.C., Chicago, and Dallas are currently experimenting with providing 
cash rewards based on student performance (Fryer 2010). 
Israel implemented two types of student incentive programs in 1999-2000.  The first 
program provided cash payments to high school students who took high school completion 
exams.  Students were paid for taking the exam and for their performance on the exam.  Students 
were chosen to participate through a lottery.  The second incentive program randomly chose high 
schools and provided cash incentives to students within those schools who took the high school 
completion exam.  Angrist and Lavy (2009) find that cash incentives in Israel improved both the 
number of students taking high school completion exams and student test scores, particularly 
when the randomization involved entire schools. 
There are other incentive programs throughout the world that focus on helping low-
income families and children succeed in primary and secondary schooling.  College students in 
the United Kingdom are eligible for money from the Educational Maintenance Allowance 
(EMA).  The EMA provides cash payments – up to thirty pounds a week – to college students 
who remain in school.  Following a successful pilot stage covering a third of the country 
(Deardon et al 2001), the EMA became available nationwide in September 2004.  Similarly, a 
                                                 
1 In a May 2007 survey of students in our sample, 65 percent reported that their parents were paying them money for 
their school performance.  This percentage did not differ across treatment and control groups.  Similarly 74 percent 
of students reported being paid for doing chores at home.     4
large Canadian university started a cash reward tied to student performance in 2005.  Angrist, 
Lang, and Oreopoulos (2007) evaluate the program finding a small improvement, particularly 
among women, in their first semester grade point average but no effect after a year. 
Kenya has also implemented a program rewarding attendance and test scores with cash 
payments.  The program focused on female students in an effort to increase female participation 
in schooling.  Evidence in Kremer, Miguel, and Thornton (2008) suggest that the effects were 
large and positive for girls.  Additionally, poor families in Mexico, Colombia, Brazil and other 
countries receive cash payments if their children get regular check-ups and attend school.   
Though these programs were paired with incentive to improve health as well, the effect on 
education is well documented (e.g. Behrman, Sengupta, & Todd 2000).   
Although many of the recent experiments were studied by economists, research on the 
effects of external incentive on students' outcomes has a long pedigree.  Psychologists were 
particularly active in examining the role of incentives and token economies during the early 
1970's.   Many of the papers focused on the effects of external or extrinsic incentives on 
contemporaneous performance (e.g. Ayllon & Azrin 1968, Kazdin 1975a & 1975b, Kazdin & 
Bootzin 1972).
2  Other papers focused on the effects of external motivators on extrinsic and 
intrinsic motivation (e.g. Deci 1975, Lepper, Greene, & Nisbett 1973).  The studies demonstrated 
that there are certain contexts in which external incentives can improve student outcomes (see 
reviews by Lepper & Greene 1978, Cameron & Pierce 2002).  For example, when students lack 
intrinsic motivation, external rewards can improve outcomes such as academic achievement and 
subsequent intrinsic motivation (e.g. Lepper, Greene, & Nisbett 1973).  By contrast, external 
rewards may reduce intrinsic motivation in students who already possess intrinsic motivation for 
learning a subject like math (e.g. Greene, Sternberg, & Lepper 1976) or art (e.g. Greene & 
Lepper 1974).  Other research in psychology has found that the efficacy of external motivators 
depends on the type of behavior being incentivized and the type of reward, and the efficacy may 
even vary from student to student (e.g. Deci 1978, Csikszentmihalyi 1978).   More recent work 
examined the implications and existence of extrinsic motivation crowding out intrinsic 
                                                 
2 As Cameron and Pierce (2002) outline, these early studies differed in the actions that students had to do to receive 
the rewards, in the expectations that students had about their potential compensation, and in the populations studied.  
Many studies rewarded students for solving a number of puzzles, engaging in a specific activity, finishing a task, or 
students' absolute or relative performance on some assessment.   5
motivation in education and in economic contexts (e.g. Gneezy & Rustichini 2000, Cameron & 
Pierce 1994, Eisenberger & Cameron 1996, Frey 1994, Frey & Oberholzer-Gee 1997). 
As we mentioned in the introduction, one of the aims of the paper is to reconcile some of 
the recent findings in economics with the established literature in psychology on the impacts of 
external incentives.  To help do this, we gathered data on intrinsic motivation in students 
participating in the program using established metrics in psychology.  Additionally, in extending 
the economics literature on financial incentives in education, we can not only measure the impact 
on primary school kids, but, similar to recent studies, we can also test whether the effects of the 
program differed by gender or generated spillover effects on non-participating students.  
 
Coshocton Incentive Program 
Coshocton is a poor, Appalachian community located in Eastern Ohio.  The economically 
depressed community is characterized by high unemployment and low manufacturing and 
agricultural wages.  According to the 2000 Census, the average income in Coshocton ($24,000) 
is significantly less than that of Ohio as a whole ($31,000).  Coshocton is a predominantly white 
community (94 percent), and over 55 percent of students in the district qualify for free/reduced 
lunch.  Additionally, as recent as 1999, Coshocton City Schools was performing so poorly that 
the state of Ohio was threatening to intercede and "take-over" the schools.   
In November 2003, Robert Simpson, long-time resident of Coshocton and the owner of 
one of Coshocton's manufacturing plants, read an editorial in Forbes magazine about paying 
students for academic performance (Miguel 2003).  The editorial highlighted results from the 
incentive program evaluated in Kremer, Miguel, and Thornton (2008).  Robert Simpson 
subsequently contacted the Coshocton City Schools, and in Spring 2004, the Simpson Family 
Foundation offered a gift of $100,000 to the Coshocton City Schools to be used to establish a 
financial incentive program for Coshocton's elementary schools.  Mr. Simpson specified that the 
district implement the program using randomization so that the district could rigorously evaluate 
the program to determine its overall effect.   
The program aims at improving achievement for all students in five core subjects.  Each 
year students in grades three through six take five different achievement tests in math, reading,   6
writing, science, and social studies.
3  Eligible students receive $15 for each test on which they 
score proficient or better.  On any test for which a student scores in the "Advanced” or 
“Accelerated" designation under Ohio's state testing program, the student receives $20 instead of 
just $15.
4  Thus, an eligible student who scores proficient on all five tests would receive $75 and 
an eligible student who scores advanced on all five tests would receive $100.  Even if a student 
passes just one test, he or she receives a financial reward.  The relevant exams vary by grade 
depending on whether state-mandated proficiency and achievement exams are required.
5 The 
school district mails students' rewards in early June after the release of testing results.  As a 
reference, over the life of the experiment about 61 percent of students typically scored above 
"Proficient" on the math tests; 33 percent scored above "Advanced;" and 16 percent scored 
"Accelerated." 
As a condition for Mr. Simpson's donation, Coshocton City Schools had to agree to 
implement the program using randomization.  The district-appointed advisory committee elected 
to randomize across grade levels within the district's elementary schools.  The unit of 
randomization is the grade level at each school.  In Coshocton, there are four elementary schools 
and four eligible grade levels (third through sixth grade) at each school.  In each year, eight of 
these 16 eligible grade-school combinations would be selected via lottery.   In each year, the 
randomization is repeated amongst the eligible grade-school combinations.   
As an example, 3
rd grade at Washington Elementary School and 6
th grade at South Lawn 
Elementary School were among the grade-school combinations chosen in the first year as 
treatment schools.  All students in all classes in that grade level at the respective schools were 
eligible for the incentive program in the 2004-05 school year.  Fifth graders at South Lawn and 
4
th graders at Washington were not chosen in that same lottery, and so these grades at these 
schools are part of the control group in the first year.  In September 2005, Coshocton City 
Schools conducted a second lottery in which eight new grade-school combinations were selected.  
                                                 
3 One worry about a program like this is that students are not fully rational.  Harbaugh and Krause (2001) show that 
students younger than eight consistently make decisions that appear irrational given prior decisions.  As a result we 
focus on students in third grade (normally age 8) and above.  Numerous studies (e.g. Bettinger and Slonim 2007) 
find high discount rates among children which would suggest that they overvalue small amounts of money but have 
less foresight for distant consumption. 
4 In 2005-06, the fifth and sixth grade students only took four exams (omitting writing).  They were compensated 
$20 for proficient and $25 for more advanced designations. 
5 Appendix Table 2 outlines the specific tests taken in each subject by each grade in each year.  We include controls 
in the regression specifications for the type of test (either Terra Nova or Ohio Proficiency).  We do not find that 
treatment effects vary by test taken.   7
In the second year, all of the third and fourth grades at Washington and fifth and sixth grades at 
South Lawn had the same chances of being selected in the lottery during the second year.  The 
Appendix provides a list of which grades at which schools were eligible for the incentive 
program in each of the three lotteries and across cohorts.
6   
The lottery was structured as follows.  First the district randomly selected one grade per 
school.  This ensured that each school would participate in the program.  This stratification also 
helps ensure that control and treatment groups are balanced (see Angrist and Lavy 2009).  After 
these four drawings (one per school), Coshocton conducted a fifth drawing in which they chose 
four additional grade-school combinations from amongst the remaining possibilities.  This 
stratification does not impact the use of randomization as a means for identifying the effects so 
long as lotteries in subsequent years are similarly performed.  We refer to those students who 
won the lottery as the "treatment" group because these students were eligible for the financial 
incentive. We refer to those students who participated in but lost the lottery as the "control" 
group.  Because of the repeated nature of the lottery, a student could be in the treatment group in 
one or more years and similarly in the control group during other years.  The lotteries were 
conducted at open school board meetings.  In the second and third years, the district brought all 
of the eligible students to the school board meeting and besides conducting the lottery held a pep 
assembly for academics featuring the high school marching band and cheerleaders.
7   We used a 
bingo-cage and ping-pong balls (one for each grade-school combination) to conduct the drawing 
                                                 
6  The advisory committee decided on this level of randomization for a number of reasons.  First, randomization at 
the school level was impractical given the number of schools in Coshocton (4) and Mr. Simpson's desire to keep the 
money in Coshocton. Second, Coshocton did not want to randomize at the student or class level. Teachers did not 
want to have some students in a particular class participating in the program and others not participating as it would 
make it difficult (and perhaps psychologically damaging) to use it as a motivational tool.  Additionally, principals 
did not want classrooms within grades at the same school to be the unit of randomization.  Principals in Coshocton 
did not want a competitive environment across classrooms within the same grade and were worried that the 
randomization could end up pitting classrooms within the same grade and the same school against each other.  Also, 
many teachers in a given grade at each of the schools have collaborative teaching arrangements where one teacher 
teaches math to all students in the grade level at the school while another teacher teaches reading.  In these team-
teaching assignments, it might be difficult for teachers to remember which students are eligible. As noted in Angrist 
and Lavy (2007), randomizing over grades within schools is similar to the research design in group-randomized-
trials often conducted across hospitals or communities.  Group-randomized trials are attractive in places where 
randomization at the student or patient level is impractical.   
7 One worry about the public lottery was that students would be disappointed if they lost.  If the loss of the lottery 
discouraged students from trying, then treatment effects could be because of negative effects on the control rather 
than positive effects on the treatment.  Part of the motivation for conducting the lottery early in the year was to allow 
time to pass so that students might forget any disappointment.  Additionally, each year we surveyed teachers and 
asked them to report on a five-point scale whether students who lost the lottery were "disappointed" or whether they 
were "less willing to take tests."  The average response was low, and teachers "somewhat disagreed" with these 
statements.   8
because it was more intuitive to students and community members than a random number 
generator.   
Rather than pay students in cash, the advisory committee elected to pay students with 
"Coshocton Children's Bucks."  The advisory committee was reluctant to give children cash 
since parents could easily take their children's cash and spend it on themselves rather than their 
children.  As a result, Coshocton's Chamber of Commerce agreed to print children's gift 
certificates redeemable at any store in Coshocton. The gift certificates say "Children" on them 
and must be redeemed for children's items.  Importantly, local retailers enforced this restriction.  
For example, cashiers at Walmart were instructed to ask the children and their parents if the 
chosen item was for the child.  The use of Coshocton Bucks helped mitigate concerns of parental 
misconduct and provided some assurance that the incentive program would benefit the children 
directly. 
 
III.  Empirical Methodology 
 
Empirical Specification 
Because of randomization, simple t-tests or regression-based comparisons between the 
treatment and control groups can provide an unbiased estimate of the causal effect of the 
program (Angrist and Krueger 1999).  We have data for all students between 1
st and 6
th grade 
starting in the 2002-03 school year and going through the 2006-07 school year.  Our most simple 
regression model is a simple difference-in-differences type regression model 
(1)   yijkt=a+b*Treatjkt+ gradek + schoolj + timet+eijkt 
where yijkt represents the outcome for student i at school j in the grade k at time t, Treatjkt is an 
indicator for whether the students at school j in grade k won the lottery and was hence eligible 
for the incentive program at time t.  The variables gradek,  schoolj, and timet are fixed effects 
controlling for just grade, school, and time.  We can augment Equation 1 to include student 
covariates such as age, gender, race, free/reduced lunch status, and pre-program test scores.   
Since student can take tests in different years from different manufacturers, we also include 
dummy variables for the manufacturer of the test (Terra Nova or Ohio Department of 
Education).  Finally, eijkt is an individual specific standard error per year.  We can interpret the 
coefficient b as the effect of the incentive program. We can focus the sample only on the three   9
years in which the program was available or we can extend the sample to include pre-program 
years. 
  In estimating our standard errors, we cluster them at the level of treatment.  All of the 
students in a specific grade in a specific school were facing similar incentives and teachers in 
these grades used assignments and other motivational reminders of the incentive program.  So in 
practice, the sample over three years may be as low as 48 – 24 "treatment" grades and 24 
"control" grades.  We correct our standard errors using the standard cluster correction.
8  
Our outcome of interest will be student test scores. Students generally take five tests – 
mathematics, reading, writing, science, and social science.  In these multiple exams, students 
may take tests from different test manufacturers within the same year.  To make these scores 
comparable, we normalized all of them according to the population mean and variance for the 
appropriate test.  For example, the third grade reading test in 2004 was published by the Ohio 
Department of Education and administered to all students in the state of Ohio.  We normalized 
Coshocton students test scores using the mean and variance for this test across the universe of 
students who took this test (i.e. the entire state of Ohio).
9  The empirical specifications include 
year and test manufacturer controls in case there are other systematic differences that 
normalizing does not account for. 
We examine each score separately for each subject except writing.  We exclude writing 
from the analysis for two reasons.  First, in any given year, some grades took the Ohio test and 
some grades took the Terra Nova.  The state-administered tests assign one of 8 possible values as 
the test score.  The Terra-Nova assigns test scores over a 307 point range.  Normalizing these test 
scores for comparison purposes was difficult.  Second, in the 2006-2007 school year, the state 
stopped administering writing exams to fourth graders, and Coshocton chose not to adopt a 
separate exam for this subject.  Fourth graders in this year were offered $20 per subject for 
passing and $25 for an advanced distinction. 
We also report various interactions between treatment status and individual 
characteristics.  We pay particular attention to interactions between gender and treatment status 
and interactions which may result in programmatic spillovers.  These interactions have proven to 
                                                 
8 Forty-eight clusters is slightly above the threshold where we would need to worry about cluster corrections in the 
face of a small number of clusters (e.g. Angrist and Lavy 2005, Donald and Lang 2007, and Wooldridge 2003).  Our 
results do not change when we correct our clustered standard errors in the way prescribed by Wooldridge (2003).   
9 In every case, we use the scale scores as the primary test score.   10
be important in other incentive literature.  We do not report interactions based on SES as we find 
no difference in treatment effects associated with free/reduced lunch participation. 
 
Verifying the Randomization 
  We first set out to determine whether the randomization yielded similar control and 
treatment groups.  While the randomization was tightly controlled so that there were no 
violations, the small number of units of randomization (24 treatment and 24 control cohorts 
across the three years) may make it so that there could be small imbalances in the randomization.   
  Table 1 shows some basic regressions attempting to demonstrate that the randomization 
yielded comparable treatment groups.  In each column of Table 1, we estimate Equation 1 using 
an individual characteristic as the dependent variable.  For example, in Column 1 we regress an 
indicator that an individual was female against their treatment status including controls for grade, 
school, and year.  We report the difference by treatment status in the likelihood of being female.  
The estimated effect is close to zero.  Below the estimated difference, we report the standard 
error controlling for correlation within a specific grade at a specific school in a specific year (i.e. 
the unit of randomization).  The difference is insignificant.  In Column 2, we perform a similar 
analysis with students' ages with similar results.  In Columns 3 and 4, we repeat the analysis for 
free/reduced lunch status and race.  In each case, we find no difference between lottery winners 
and losers in this characteristic.  The final column includes an indicator for whether or not the 
student wont the lottery in the previous year.  In the last two years of the experiment, about 28 
percent of students who won the lottery in one year, won the lottery in the next year.  Given that 
3
rd graders could not have won the lottery in the prior year, the percent was higher (39 percent) 
among students who participated in the prior year lottery.  The estimate suggests that winners 
were about 17 percentage points more likely to win the lottery if they participated in the prior 
year.  This difference is not statistically significant although the standard error bands are large.  
Given the method of randomization was such that winning in one year was orthogonal to 
winning in the prior year, any deviation is the result of random imbalance over the small number 
of cells over which we are randomizing. 
Another dimension to evaluate the randomization is to examine the test scores of students 
prior to the start of the program.  In the 2003-2004 school year, the year prior to the program   11
beginning, almost all of the students in the school district were tested.
10  For each lottery, we 
assemble the data to include both lottery winners' and losers' pre-program test scores.  We then 
stack the respective lotteries to test for balance across control and treatment across all lotteries.
11  
As in the previous results, the lotteries look balanced.  In Table 2, we estimate differences of 
0.0647 standard deviations in math and 0.0607 standard deviations in reading without including 
covariates.  Once we control for covariates, these differences fall to 0.0146 and 0.0210 standard 
deviations respectively.
12   
Finally, another way to see the balance in the lottery is to observe the distribution of the 
lottery winners across grades and schools.  Over the three years, each school was guaranteed at 
least one winner per year because of the stratification of the lottery.  We would expect that the 
other winners would be equally distributed across schools.  In the end, the 24 winning grade-
school-year combinations were distributed as follows:  two schools had six winners each; one 
had seven; and one had five.  Across grades, the distribution included the following: 8 winners 
from third grade, 5 winners from fourth grade, 3 winners from fifth grade, and 8 winners from 6
th 
grade.  The distribution is somewhat more skewed across grades than across schools, but given 
that differences across students and socioeconomic status is larger across schools than across 
grades, the unequal distribution across grades is not too troubling. 
  
IV.  Baseline Results 
 
Mathematics 
Table 3 shows the baseline results for math test scores.  Each column in Table 3 is a 
separate estimate of Equation 1.  The sample focuses exclusively on students who participated in 
the lottery.  This includes students in third through sixth grade in the 2004-05 through 2006 -07 
school years.  The data are longitudinal so that a student could appear multiple times depending 
on their grade level.  The sample size for math is slightly higher than in the previous tables in 
                                                 
10 Students who were in 3rd grade in 2007 were in kindergarten at this time.  They were the only students not tested 
in 2004.  For this group, we use the 2006 test scores from their second grade year.  This is the first time that they 
were administered tests.  They were not eligible for the incentive program in 2006. 
11 Alternatively, we could run each lottery year individually.  We do this without finding any statistically significant 
differences although with clustering we do not have statistical power in evaluating one lottery individually. 
12 The sample is larger for reading since 3
rd graders take both the standardized exam in both fall and spring.  We 
have included all previous reading tests.  The results are similar if we focus only on the maximum score in the pre-
program test scores.   12
that we have included students for which demographic data were missing.  We have included 
indicator variables to note when demographic variables are missing. 
When we just compare math scores for students eligible for the payments and for students 
who were not eligible, we find that eligible students’ math scores were about 0.19 standard 
deviations higher.  This is a significant difference.  These baseline regressions include controls 
for grade, year, school, and test type (i.e. manufacturer).  Given that at least half of the treatment 
group were chosen in school-year specific lotteries, we can also include school by year effects to 
control for systematic differences across schools in each year.  When we also add school by year 
fixed effects, the estimated effect is about 0.14 standard deviations and remains significant.  In 
Column 3, we include additional controls for age, gender, and race.  With these additional 
controls, the difference stays roughly the same (0.18 standard deviations) and remains 
significant.  When we add additional school by year fixed effects, the estimated effect is about 
0.13 standard deviations and the estimate remains significant. 
The results in Table 3 seem to suggest a significant, positive effect of the incentive 
program in math on math scores.  In Table 4, we examine the effects of the program on students' 
passage rates which were the thresholds for which students were rewarded.  The state of Ohio 
assigns students to one of five categories based on students' scale score in the respective grades.  
These five categories are from lowest to highest, deficient, basic, proficient, advanced, and 
accelerated.  Students were paid $15 if they made it to proficient and an additional $5 if they 
scored advanced or accelerated.  In Table 4, we show the estimated effects of the program on 
different test score measures based on the five-point categorization used by the state. 
In the first column, we show the basic results using the five point distribution as the 
dependent variable.  Here we find that students eligible for the awards score, on average, 0.2 
levels higher than other students.  In Columns 2 and 3, we present a linear probability model 
where the dependent variable is whether students scored basic or higher or proficient or higher 
respectively.
13  In these results, we get point estimates of 2-3 percentage points, and the 
estimated effect is not significant.  The results suggest little impact on the proportion of students 
scoring over these margins.  In Column 4, we repeat this analysis except we focus on students 
scoring advanced (level 4) or higher.  Here we find significant results.  Students who were 
eligible for the incentive program were 9.2 percentage points more likely to score above this 
                                                 
13 In Columns 2-4, we find similar results when we estimate Probit models instead of linear probability models.   13
threshold.  Given that about one-third of students score advanced or better, the estimated results 
suggest a sizeable increase in students' test scores.  In Column 5 of Table 4, we repeat this 
exercise focusing on whether students scored accelerated (level 5).  About 16 percent of students 
scored in this range, and the program increased the likelihood that students scored in this range 
by 5.2 percentage points. 
The results in Table 4 suggest that the program was not effective in moving students over 
the proficient/non-proficient margin.  The estimated effect is small and insignificant.  By 
contrast, the program was quite successful in helping students move from scoring proficient to 
scoring advanced or accelerated.   
Another way to verify theses results is to examine how the treatment effect varied with 
prior achievement.  Assuming that the ranking of students' test scores is similar over time, 
interactions with pre-program achievement may show whether the estimated effect is strong at 









q c *1(Quartile=q)i(t=2004) 
+ gradek + schoolj + timet+eijkt 
 
where q indexes the quartile of achievement for students in pre-program test scores (i.e. 2004 test 
scores) and the 1(Quartile=q) is a series of indicator variables for whether the student was in the 
specific quartile in 2004.  We also include an additional category for students for whom there is 
no test score in 2004 (e.g. students moving in the district).    
  The estimates of equation 2 are reported in Table 5.  For reference, we include the 
baseline specification with controls for the lagged score in the first column.  The results in 
Columns 2 and 3 show the results by previous test score.  We find significant positive effects for 
students who had previously been identified at the top of the test score distribution.  We find 
small, positive, insignificant estimates for the students in the middle of the distribution.   
Interestingly, we find positive, significant effects for students at the bottom of the distribution.  
Given the results in Table 4, the fact that the bottom of the distribution improves suggests that 
students in that group are improving their test scores but not enough to make a significant change 
in the proportion of students scoring greater than the proficient threshold.   14
In sum, we find positive, significant effects on math test scores particularly for students at 
the top of the distribution.  These effects served to move students over thresholds (advanced and 
accelerated) that are considered significant by the state of Ohio.    This is similar to Leuven, 
Oosterbeek, and van der Klaauw (2010) which finds that high scoring students were more 
responsive to financial incentives.  We find very little movement in the middle of the distribution 
and a positive but insignificant effect on the proportion of students scoring proficient.  We also 
find positive effects at the bottom of the distribution but these effects did not seem to push 




Table 6 shows the estimated effects on reading test scores.  The specifications are 
identical to the previous table except they focus on differences in reading test scores.  While all 
of the point estimates are positive, none of the estimated treatment effects are statistically 
significant.  The standard errors are similar to the previous table, but the estimated treatment 
effects are much smaller ranging from 0.01 to 0.02 standard deviations.  Additionally, although 
we do not report the estimates in the tables, we find no significant effects when we examine the 
how the program affected students at significant thresholds defining whether students are 
proficient, advanced, or accelerated. 
Finding an effect in math but not reading is similar to findings in previous studies on 
educational interventions (e.g. Reardon, Cheadle, and Robinson 2008, Rouse 1998). Educational 
interventions often increase math scores with little to no impact on reading scores. Math 
particularly in the grades studied seems to be more elastic than other subjects.
14  Similarly, the 
early psychological research on extrinsic rewards found that extrinsic motivators were more 
effective as tasks were less conceptual in nature (e.g. Lepper and Greene 1978).  Math is less 
conceptual than reading in early grades.  Students can memorize a series of facts in math that can 
adequately prepare them for most tests.  By contrast, it is much more difficult for students to 
prepare for a specific reading text.   
                                                 
14 One theory as to why math is more elastic than reading focuses on parents' contributions to students' educations.  
In primary grades, much of students' reading experiences take place in the home while math instruction occurs 
largely in the schools.  Some evidence of this is that the falloff in test scores between spring and fall are greater in 
math than in reading since students have less contact with math than reading over the course of the summer (Cooper, 
Nye, Charlton, Lindsay, and Greathouse 1996).     15
While Table 6 shows no significant change in reading test scores, we do detect some 
change in students' efforts in reading.  Coshocton City Schools participates in a program called 
Accelerated Reader (AR).  AR assigns point values to books (e.g. Harry Potter and the Goblet of 
Fire is worth 32 points).  Point totals are assigned according to the difficulty, length, and 
importance of the book.  For the students who were in 3
rd or 4
th grade during 2005, we can track 
their accelerated reader points for three years.   The average amount of points was 62.7 with a 
standard deviation of 56.5.  When we compare the point totals of winners and losers (using 
Equation 1), we find that lottery winners earned about 13 accelerated reader points more than 
students who were not eligible.  While this may only be the equivalent of reading just one extra 
book per year, it does suggest increased effort in reading.  
Fryer (2010) provides some evidence that students’ achievement is more likely to 
increase when students are incentivized for inputs to educational production rather than outputs.  
For example, when students were incentivized to read books which pushed them to expand their 
vocabulary and reading comprehension, their achievement increased more than it did in other 
sites where students were compensated purely for their reading test scores.  In Coshocton, 
students may not have realized that that additional reading may have improved test scores or they 
may not have been as aggressive as they were in other incentive programs where students were 
rewarded for pushing themselves to read more difficult books. 
 
Alternative Subjects 
  Students were also tested in social science and science.  Table 7 reports the estimated 
effects in each of these disciplines.  Our specifications are identical to the baseline model.  
  The social studies results (Panel A) do not show any effect of the incentive program on 
test scores.  We find positive effects around 0.05 standard deviations; however, the estimates are 
never significant.  In science, the results (Panel B) are similar.  We do not find significant 
estimates in any of the specifications and the point estimates are close to zero.   
 
V.  Relationship to Previous Research 
 
Intrinsic versus Extrinsic Motivation   16
  One of the most controversial aspects of the program was its potential impact on intrinsic 
motivation.  Research in psychology has debated for over three decades on whether external 
incentive programs inhibit students' subsequent intrinsic motivation and performance (e.g. 
Lepper & Greene 1978, Cameron & Pierce 2002, Deci, Koestner & Ryan 2001).  Deci et al 
(2001) make the claim that the consensus in psychology is that extrinsic rewards somehow 
inhibit students' subsequent intrinsic motivation.  Cameron and Pierce (2002) argue that this 
conclusion is limited to specific payment schemes (e.g. rewards for participation versus rewards 
for absolute or relative achievement) and the nature of the reward (unexpected versus expected).  
In their meta-analysis of 145 studies, they find 11 studies in which participants were paid for 
exceeding a specific score on a task – similar to the Coshocton incentive program.  Across those 
studies, they find no effect on intrinsic motivation as measured by observing students' 
subsequent choices, and they find an increase in intrinsic motivation coming from students' self-
reported interest measures. 
  In May 2007, the school district attempted to gather data on the intrinsic motivation of 
students using two methods.  First, 432 students completed the Academic Self-Regulation 
Questionnaire (SRQ-A) which measures students' intrinsic and extrinsic motivation for academic 
tasks.
15  Studies that have argued that incentives crowd out intrinsic motivation have used the 
SRQ-A to measure intrinsic motivation (Ryan and Connell 1989, Grolnick, Ryan, and Deci 
1991, Miserandino 1996).  Second, teachers rated on a five-point scale the degree to which 
students possessed an "internal desire to do well for the sake of doing well or learning" in math 
and in reading. 
  In the SRQ-A measure of intrinsic motivation, we find no significant difference across 
treatment and control groups.  The mean measure is 2.48 with a standard deviation of 0.80 
(min=1, max=4).  The raw difference between treatment and control groups was -0.05 (s.e.=0.08) 
and the difference after controlling for school and grade effects was -0.08 (s.e.=0.09).  Similarly, 
we find no statistically significant differences in measures of external regulation where the raw 
difference was 0.03 (s.e.=0.06) and the regression-adjusted difference was 0.09 (s.e.=0.07).  The 
estimated differences are all small and not statistically significant.  
  Teachers' ratings of students presented similar results.  The average rating for students' 
math was 3.20 with a standard deviation of 1.19 and the average rating for reading was 3.18 with 
                                                 
15 Detailed descriptions are available at http://psych.rochester.edu/SDT/measures/selfreg_acad.html.   17
a standard deviation of 1.13.  When we compare students who were eligible for the cash 
incentive versus non-eligible students, the raw difference in the math intrinsic motivation score 
was statistically significant suggesting greater levels of intrinsic motivation among the treatment 
(difference=0.24 with a standard error of 0.12), but this difference disappears once we control for 
school and grade (regression-adjusted difference=0.02 with s.e. = 0.13).  In reading, we never 
find significant effects with the regression-adjusted difference being 0.005 (s.e.=0.13).   
The direct measures of intrinsic motivation do not suggest any significant drop-off in 
students' interest as a result of the program.  The estimated differences are small and not 
precisely estimated.  Additional data might shed more light on the potential effects of the 
program on intrinsic motivation, but we find no measurable change in these behaviors between 
treatment and control groups in our study. 
Another potential indicator of students’ intrinsic motivation is their subsequent 
performance in the subject.  For example, consider the experiment where the treatment includes 
two consecutive lotteries.  There are four separate possibilities:  students could win in both years, 
win in first but not second, win in second but not first, or lose in both periods.  If students' 
intrinsic motivation declined, then students who were eligible in one year but not the next should 
experience a decline in test scores.  Because of the multi-year nature of the Coshocton 
experiment, our data includes a number of these consecutive lottery experiments.
16  We caution 
that in the consecutive lottery experiment, parsing the data into small groups may compromise 
the randomization.  In our large sample, we would expect balance, but given the low number of 
clusters in our study, estimates using the consecutive lottery experiment are noisy.
17   
To estimate the effects of the consecutive lottery experiment, we replace the treatment 
indicator in Equation 1 with indicator variables for when students were treated in the consecutive 
lottery experiment (i.e win-loss, loss-win, win-win).  The comparison group includes students 
who never won.  We report these results in Table 8.  By extending our data to include seventh 
and eighth graders who ever participated in the experiment and by adding the 2007-2008 data, 
we increase the data by about 1200 student observations or by nearly 40 clusters.  While we have 
                                                 
16 We could even have an experiment of three consecutive lotteries, but this would divide the data into eight 
partitions with only a small sample of clusters in each partition.  Our sample size is not sufficiently large to argue 
that these eight partitions would have been balanced by randomization.   
17 With the additional data from 2007-2008 and from expanding the sample to include 7
th and 8
th graders, we end up 
with 85 clusters divided among the four treatments.   18
more clusters, our statistical power is still limited given that we are separating the sample into 
four treatment groups instead of two.   
  Row 1 shows the test scores of students who won the lottery in the prior year but not this 
year.  The estimates are very noisy, yet when we look at the point estimates, these students test 
scores are virtually identical to those of the control group.  Any gains that they may have 
experienced from winning the lottery in the prior year do not persist into the next year.  This is 
different from previous research by Leuven, Oosterbeek, and van der Klaauw (2010) which finds 
persistent effects once the incentives are no longer available.  Additionally and more relevant for 
our discussion of intrinsic motivation, the results in Row 1 suggest that students’ test scores do 
not fall below that of the control group.  If students’ intrinsic motivation for learning is lower 
after experiencing the incentives in the prior year, then we would have expected a decline in test 
scores.   
Rows 2 and 3 report the effects of the intervention on students who won the lottery in the 
current year but either won or lost in the prior year.  In both cases, the point estimate is similar, 
and in the case of students who had won the lottery for the first time, the coefficient is 
marginally significant.   
In sum, we find no evidence that the incentive program eroded students' intrinsic 
motivation.  This is true when we measure intrinsic motivation directly.  It is also true when we 
use subsequent performance as a measure of intrinsic motivation.   
 
 
Effects by Gender 
  We can also test whether there are significant differences between the responses of boys 
and girls to the incentive program.  Previous studies (e.g. Angrist, Lang, and Oreopoulos 2007, 
Angrist and Lavy 2009) have found that the effects of incentives on females have been larger 
than those for males.  To test this, we can also augment our basic specification by interacting 
gender with the treatment effect to detect whether there is a statistically significant difference 
between the treatment effects for boys and girls.  These results appear in Table 9.  In these 
estimates, the treatment effect for boys is between 0.12 and 0.17 standard deviations in math and 
negligible in reading.  The coefficient on the interaction between females and the treatment 
shows the difference between the treatment effects for boys and girls.  Here we always estimate a   19
positive difference although it is never significant.  The standard errors are fairly generous on the 
interaction term so it is difficult to put bounds on what the difference in the treatment effects 
may be.   
 
Spillover Effects 
  We can also test whether the incentive program had spillover effects within families.  
Previous research by Kremer, Miguel and Thornton (2008) shows a large spillover effect among 
boys in response to an incentive program focused on girls.  In the Coshocton Incentive Program, 
about 14 percent of the control group had siblings who were eligible for the program.  If the 
incentive program leads to greater effort for an eligible child, siblings may try harder as well.  In 
focus groups with parents, some parents reported that they had provided the incentive program 
for their children who were not selected to be part of the incentive program in one year. 
  To test for spillovers, we augment our basic model by including an indicator variable for 
cases where students have siblings who are eligible but the student him/herself is not.  The 
results of this exercise appear in Table 10.  The treatment effects are nearly identical to those 
treatment effects reported in other tables.  The effect of the incentive program in math is between 
0.11 and 0.17 standard deviations.  The effect of the incentive program in reading is not 
significant and the point estimate is small.  If spillovers exist within families, we should see 
significant estimates for the sibling indicator.  However, we fail to find any significant effect.  
The point estimates are always negative and the results are not statistically significant.  As 
before, the standard errors are large enough that we cannot reject that there could be spillover 
effects of some magnitude, but we do not find any significant results in the Coshocton 
experiment.   
 
VI.  Discussion and Conclusion 
The paper presents evidence from the Coshocton Incentive Program.  The Coshocton 
Incentive Program offered students between grades three and six financial incentives to perform 
well on standardized tests.  We identify the results of the program by taking advantage of the 
randomization of which grades at which schools were eligible for the cash award.  The results 
are positive and significant in math but not in reading, social science, or science.     20
Was it really the incentives or was some other force at work?  Because of the research 
design, we cannot identify whether the effects arise from teachers performing differently in years 
when their students were eligible or whether students were actively responding directly to the 
incentive.   Annual teacher surveys suggest that teachers used different tools in years that their 
students were eligible.  For example, a popular writing assignment focused on how students 
would spend "their" money.  One teacher decorated the room with paper $100 bills, and a couple 
of teachers used the rallying cry "Show me the Money" to start math instruction.  There were 
also no changes in teachers' use of other student incentive programs (e.g. pizza party, video game 
rewards) regardless of whether they were in the control group or the treatment group.  While our 
research suggests that math scores improved in the program, over time teachers became less 
convinced of the program's efficacy.  When asked to rate the program's efficacy on a five-point 
scale (5=best), teachers' average responses fell from 4.2 in 2005 to 3.8 in 2006 to 3.1 in 2007. 
Another piece of evidence suggesting that teachers' behavior affected the outcome comes 
from a complimentary experiment conducted in the 2007-2008 school year.  In the 2007-2008 
school year, Coshocton offered a math and reading incentive of up to $25 to 7
th and 8
th grade 
students for the state-mandated math and reading results.  In this case, however, Coshocton 
permitted us to randomize eligibility at the student level.  The purpose was to see whether 
students would respond when teachers were not reminding them.  Teachers did not know which 
students were eligible for the rewards in their classes.  Among this group, we find that there is no 
treatment effect.  After controlling for individual characteristics, lottery winners scored .070 
lower than other students (with a standard error of .103).  There is a lot of noise here, but the 
treatment effects reported in Table 3 are outside the 95 percent confidence interval surrounding 
the estimated effect on 7
th and 8
th graders.  There are two possible explanations for this result.  
First these students are older and may respond differently to incentive programs than the younger 
students.  Fifty dollars may be less valuable to older children who have a more understanding of 
the value of money.  Second, these students had no reinforcement from the teachers which would 
support the hypothesis that the treatment effect worked through teachers. 
Yet we also have some evidence that students may have increased their effort in response 
to the program.  We asked teachers to rate on a five point scale whether their "students were 
more motivated to perform well."  There were statistically significant differences suggesting that 
students in the treatment were more likely to be motivated.  Additionally, the Coshocton City   21
Schools conducts special extra-curricular workshops to help students prepare for Spring test 
administrations.  When asked to report whether students were willing "to participate in extra 
help," teachers whose students were eligible for the reward program agreed with this statement 
more than teachers whose students were not eligible for the reward.
18  One possibility is that 
students who attended these special after school sessions learned test-taking strategies; however, 
when we examine students' item responses, we find that the probability that a student left a 
question blank was identical across control and treatment groups.  We find no statistically 
significant evidence that students in the treatment had better "test-taking" strategies. 
Finally, we turn to the cost effectiveness of Coshocton's program.  Coshocton's Incentive 
Program was highly cost effective relative to other educational interventions.  Across the three 
years, Coshocton's program cost about $52,000, and math scores improved by about 0.15 
standard deviations.  The overall cost of Coshocton's program was similar to the average teacher 
salary in Coshocton which was $50,704 in 2007.  Suppose instead of using the incentive program 
that Coshocton had hired an extra teacher to work 1/3 of the year for each of the three years of 
the experiment.  If Coshocton had used the money to hire another teacher, the average class size 
in third to sixth grade would have only fallen from 19.4 in 2007 to 19.2.
19  By contrast, in Project 
STAR class size dropped from the around 24 to around 15, and the average test score gain in 
math and reading from small classes was 0.25.  If the gain from class size is linear, then the 
reduction in class size that would have happened in Coshocton (0.2 students per class) would 
have generated a 0.006 standard deviation increase in math and reading test scores.  The point 
estimate for the reading gain (.010) and the observed 0.15 standard deviation gain in math 
exceed any projected gain from class size. 
Additionally, the overall expenditure on the program was only 0.15 percent of the 
district's overall instruction expenditure.  The average instructional expenditure per student in 
2006-2007 was $5,469.  The average expenditure per student eligible for the treatment was about 
$53 – about one percent of the overall instructional expenditure, and in Coshocton's case, all of 
the money came from private donations.  Hence, in summation, the Coshocton incentive program 
                                                 
18 In May 2007, the district surveyed students about their study habits.  There was no statistically significant 
difference in the number of hours students reported studying across treatment and control in both reading and math.  
Also, students in the treatment actually reported that they were less likely to participate in extra-curricular study 
sessions.  This difference was statistically significant and in direct contrast to teachers' perceptions. 
19 Coshocton would have had to hire 7.6 new teachers to reduce class size to 15.   22
was a cost effective program which led to substantial math test score gains, especially for 
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Table 1.  Differences Between Treatment and Control Groups in Pre-Lottery Characteristics. 
 
 Female    Age   





White   Won  Lottery 
in Prior Year 




















School Controls  Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes    Yes 
N 1527    1504 1527  1527    991 
N (students)  893    887  893  893    680 
N (grade-school 
combinations) 
48   48  48  48    32 
Notes:  Sample includes students in 3
rd through 6
th grade for the 2004-05 to the 2006-07 school 
years.  Standard errors in brackets control for clustering across grade-school-year combinations 
which is the level at which treatment was assigned.  Sample drops in Column 5 since we only 
report results for students in 2005-06 and 2006-2007 which are the only years in which a student 




Table 2.  Differences Between Treatment and Control Groups in Pre-Program Test Scores 
 




















Grade, Year, School Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Controls for Age, Gender, and 
Race  No Yes  No  Yes 
N 1572  1572  2637  2637 
N (students)  817  817  844  844 
N (grade-school combinations)  48  48  48  48 
 
Notes:  Sample includes students in 3
rd through 6
th grade for the 2004-05 to the 2006-07 school 
years.  Standard errors in brackets control for clustering across grade-school-year combinations 
which is the level at which treatment was assigned.  
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Table 3. OLS Estimates of Effects of Pay to Learn on Math Test Scores 
 
  Lottery Sample, 3
rd-6
th Grade from 2004-05 to 2006-2007
















































Grade, Year, School Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
School by Year Interactions  No  Yes  No  Yes 
R-squared  .144 .155 .190  .201 
N  1615 1615 1615  1615 
N  (students)  873 873 873  873 
N (grade- school-year)  48  48  48  48 
Notes:  Sample includes students in 3
rd through 6
th grade for the 2004-05 to the 2006-07 school 
years.  Standard errors in brackets control for clustering across grade-school-year combinations 
which is the level at which treatment was assigned.  
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Table 4.  Effect of Incentive Program on  
Proficient Rates for Ohio Mathematics Achievement Test 
 
  Lottery Sample, 3
rd-6
th Grade from 2004-05 to 2006-2007 











































Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Grade, Year, School 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 1248  1248  1248  1248  1248 
N (students)  840  840  840  840  840 
N (grade- school-year)  40  40  40  40  40 
Notes:  Sample includes students in 3
rd through 6
th grade for the 2004-05 to the 2006-07 school 
years.  Standard errors in brackets control for clustering across grade-school-year combinations 
which is the level at which treatment was assigned.  The sample does not include third and fifth 
graders in 2005.  These students took the Terra Nova exam rather than the Ohio Achievement 
Test in that year.    
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Table 5.  Distributional Effects of Incentive Program on Math Achievement 
 
  Lottery Sample, 3
rd-6
th Grade from 2004-05 to 2006-2007
  (1) (2) (3) 

































































Age, Female, Race, and 
Socioeconomic Control  Yes Yes Yes 
Grade, Year, School Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes 
School by Year Fixed Effects  No  No  Yes 
Lagged Achievement  
Quartile Fixed Effects 
Yes Yes Yes 
N  1615 1615 1615 
N  (students)  873 873 873 
N (grade- school-year)  48  48  48 
Notes:  Sample includes students in 3
rd through 6
th grade for the 2004-05 to the 2006-07 school 
years.  Standard errors in brackets control for clustering across grade-school-year combinations 
which is the level at which treatment was assigned.    
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Table 6. OLS Estimates of Effects of Pay to Learn on Reading Test Scores 
 
  Lottery Sample, 3
rd-6
th Grade from 2004-05 to 2006-2007















































Grade, Year, School Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
School by Year Interactions  No  Yes  No  Yes 
N 2341  2341  2341  2341 
N (students)  887  887  887  887 
N (grade- school-year)  48  48  48  48 
Notes:  Sample includes students in 3
rd through 6
th grade for the 2004-05 to the 2006-07 school 
years.  Standard errors in brackets control for clustering across grade-school-year combinations 
which is the level at which treatment was assigned.  The sample increases relative to Table 3 
because third grade students take two exams per year.  We have included both exams.  Results 
do not change if we include on the spring exam or the highest exam score for each third grader. 
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Table 7. OLS Estimates of Effects of Pay to Learn on Other Test Scores 
 
 Lottery  Sample 
3
rd-6
th Grade from 2004-05 to 2006-07 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 













Age, Gender, Race, FRL Controls No  Yes  Yes 
School by Year FE  No  No  Yes 
N 1488  1488  1488 
N (students)  866  866  866 
N (grade- school-year)  48  48  48 
        













Age, Gender, Race, FRL Controls No  Yes  Yes 
School by Year FE  No  No  Yes 
N 1488  1488  1488 
N (students)  866  866  866 
N (grade- school-year)  48  48  48 
Notes:  Sample includes students in 3
rd through 6
th grade for the 2004-05 to the 2006-07 school 
years.  Standard errors in brackets control for clustering across grade-school-year combinations 
which is the level at which treatment was assigned.    
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Table 8.  Math Scores in Year After Treatment 
 
  All Students who Ever Participated in Lottery 
from 2004-05 to 2007-2008 
 (1)  (2) 
Won Lottery Last Year  









Won Lottery This Year 





Won Lottery This Year  





Age, Gender, Race, FRL Controls Yes  Yes 
Grade, Year, School Controls  Yes  Yes 
School by Year Interactions  No  Yes 
N 2846  2846 
N (students)  1106  1106 
N (grade- school-year)  85  85 
Notes:  Sample includes all students who participated in the lottery at any time.  Previous tables 
excluded students once they were not eligible for the lottery.    
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 Table 9.  Estimated Treatment Effects by Gender 
 
  Lottery Sample, 3
rd-6
th Grade from 2004-05 to 2006-2007
  Math Test Scores  Reading Test Scores 





























Age, Gender, Race, FRL Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Grade, Year, School Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
School by Year Interactions  No  Yes  No  Yes 
N  1615 1615 2341 2341 
N  (students)  873 873 887 887 
N  (grade-  school-year)  48 48 48 48 
Notes:  Sample includes students in 3
rd through 6
th grade for the 2004-05 to the 2006-07 school 
years.  Standard errors in brackets control for clustering across grade-school-year combinations 
which is the level at which treatment was assigned.    
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Table 10.  Estimated Spillover Effects  
 
  Lottery Sample, 3
rd-6
th Grade from 2004-05 to 2006-2007
  Math Test Scores  Reading Test Scores 















Sibling was Eligible for Treatment 














Age, Gender, Race, FRL Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Grade, Year, School Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
School by Year Interactions  No  Yes  No  Yes 
N  1615 1615 2341 2341 
N  (students)  873 873 887 887 
N  (grade-  school-year)  48 48 48 48 
Notes:  Sample includes students in 3
rd through 6
th grade for the 2004-05 to the 2006-07 school 
years.  Standard errors in brackets control for clustering across grade-school-year combinations 
which is the level at which treatment was assigned.    
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Appendix Table 1. Coshocton Incentive Winners 
 
2004-2005  School Year 




Central   3
rd, 6
th  






2005-06   School Year 
Washington 5
th  
Central   3
rd, 5
th  













Central   4
th, 6
th 












Treatment Years By School Cohort: 




Washington 1  2007 
 2  2007 
 3  2005 
  4  2005, 2006, 2007 
 5   
 6  2005 
Central 1   
 2  2006,  2007 
 3  2005 
 4  2006,  2007 
 5   
 6  2005 
South Lawn  1   
 2  2006 
  3  2005, 2006, 2007 
 4   
 5  2006 
 6  2005 
Lincoln 1  2007 
 2   
 3  2005,  2006 
 4  2007 
 5  2006 




Appendix Table 2. Incentivized Tests by Grade Year 
 
 Math  Reading  Science  Social 
Science 
Writing 
2004-05          





TN TN TN 
Grade 4  OAT  OAT  OAT  OAT  OAT 
Grade 5  TN  TN  TN  TN  TN 
Grade 6  OAT  OAT  OAT  OAT  OAT 
          
2005-06          
Grade 3  OAT  OAT  TN  TN  TN 
Grade 4  OAT  OAT  TN  TN  OAT 
Grade 5  OAT  OAT  TN  TN  -- 
Grade 6  OAT  OAT  TN  TN  -- 
          
2006-07          
Grade 3  OAT  OAT  TN  TN  TN 
Grade 4  OAT  OAT  TN  TN  OAT 
Grade 5  OAT  OAT  OAT  OAT  -- 
Grade 6  OAT  OAT  TN  TN  TN 
 
Notes:  Test manufacturer for each test in each subject administered in each year of the incentive 
program.  
 